Strategic Goal Chapters

Strategic Goal 1: Regional Stability
Avert and Resolve Local and Regional Conflicts to Preserve Peace and Minimize Harm to the National Interests of the United States

I. Public Benefit

The United States must provide for the safety of Americans at home and abroad, protect against threats to its interests worldwide, and honor commitments to its allies and friends. The activities of the Department and USAID are cost-effective means for enhancing and ensuring stability in all regions of the world through understanding, addressing, and responding early to the causes and consequences of violent conflict. Through diplomacy and development assistance, the U.S. builds and strengthens relations with neighbors and allies worldwide by promoting peaceful regional environments and by educating foreign audiences in ways that can prevent, manage, and mitigate conflicts, and foster cooperative efforts. The benefits to the U.S. are greatest when the world is safer and more stable. Early action to address failing, failed, and recovering states, or "fragile states" is central to promoting regional stability and addressing the source of our nation's most pressing security threats. Factors that contribute to fragility and regional instability include, but are not limited to, economic and political instability; health crises; the illegal trade in toxic chemicals and dumping of hazardous wastes; corruption; violent ethnic conflict; influence of neighboring country interests; population movements; landmine contamination; exploitation of natural resources; proliferation of small arms and light weapons; trafficking in persons; the trade of illegal conflict diamonds; natural disasters; and systemic, state-sponsored denial of political and legal rights. The Department and USAID advance U.S. national security interests through the resolution of regional instability, so that Americans, at home and abroad, are safe from violence.

II. Resource Summary ($ in Thousands)

	FY 2004 Actual	FY 2005 Estimate	FY 2006 Request	Change from FY 2005	
				Amount	%
Staff [1]	1,267	1,240	1,238	(2)	(0.2%)
Funds [2]	$6,367,266	$5,831,955	$6,102,256	$270,301	4.6%

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[1] Department of State direct-funded positions.
[2] Funds include both Department of State Appropriations Act Resources and Foreign Operations Resources, where applicable.

III. Strategic Goal Context

Shown below are the performance goals, initiatives/programs, and the resources, bureaus and partners that contribute to accomplishment of the "Regional Stability" strategic goal. Acronyms are defined in the glossary at the back of this publication.

Strategic Goal	Performance Goal (Short Title)	Initiative/ Program	Major Resources	Lead Bureau(s)[1]	Partners
Regional Stability	Close Ties with Allies and Friends	Transatlantic Relationship	D&CP, FMF, IMET, ESF	EUR, PM	N/A
		International Military Education and Training	D&CP, IMET, FMF	PM	Office of the Secretary of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency (OSD/DSCA), Joint Staff
		Military Assistance for New NATO/NATO-Aspirant Nations	D&CP, FMF, IMET	EUR, PM	DoD, Joint Staff
		Regional Stability in East Asia & Pacific	D&CP	EAP	DoD
	Resolution of Regional Conflicts	Prevent/Resolve Regional and Local Conflicts	D&CP	EAP	DoD
		Conflict Management and Mitigation	D&CP, PKO, IMET, FMF, DA, ESF, TI	AF, *AFR, DCHA/CMM*	AU, DoD, EU, UNDPKO, France, UK, Belgium, ECOWAS, Nigeria, Senegal, Ghana, Kenya, Benin, Mali
		Regional Security Cooperation & Arms Control	D&CP	AC, EUR	DoD, NATO, OSCE
		Peace Support Operations	D&CP, PKO	PM	OSD/SOLIC, NAVAIR, CCMR
		Implementation of the Road Map	D&CP, ESF	EB, NEA, *PPC/DCO*	NSC, CIA
		Iraq & Gulf Security	D&CP, FMF, IMET, ESF, INCLE, HRDF, IRRF	NEA, PM, *ANE/IR*	NSC, DoD, Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, FAA, Education, HHS, International Broadcasting Bureau, DOJ, Energy, UN
		Iraq Reconstruction and Economic Development	D&CP, ESF, IRRF	NEA, *ANE/IR*	DoD, Treasury
		Security Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa	D&CP, PKO, ESF, IMET, FMF	AF, PM	AU, DoD, EU, ECOWAS, UNDPKO, Netherlands, Belgium, France, UK, Nigeria, Senegal, Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, Benin, Mali, Ethiopia, Djibouti
		Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities	CIPA, D&CP	IO	NSC, DoD, UNDPKO, UNSC, UN members

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[1] USAID components are shown in blue italicized fonts.

IV. Performance Summary

For each initiative/program that supports accomplishment of this strategic goal, the most critical FY 2006 performance indicators and targets are shown below.

Annual Performance Goal #1
CLOSE, STRONG, AND EFFECTIVE U.S. TIES WITH ALLIES, FRIENDS, PARTNERS, AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

I/P #1: Transatlantic Relationship

An enhanced and expanded Euro-Atlantic Partnership to promote stability, security, democracy, and prosperity within the region and build support for U.S. strategic goals beyond Europe.

Outcome Indicator

Indicator #1: Status of Transatlantic Security Relationships

TARGETS		
	FY 2006	1. NATO increases the size and scope of its training mission inside Iraq. 2. NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Operation Enduring Freedom-led military operations in Afghanistan are consolidated. 3. NATO stages large-scale military exercise in the Middle East and Central Asia and the Caucasus; four more Gulf states join NATO's security cooperation initiative for the Middle East; three more Central Asian and Caucasus states conclude Individualized Partnership Action Plans. 4. NATO Response Force (NRF) reaches full operational capability following certification. The NRF is a state-of-the-art 20,000-person force to respond quickly to emergencies. 5. Ukraine further intensifies relationship with NATO, depending on progress on reform. 6. Russia launches peacekeeping brigade fully interoperable with NATO. 7. Maintain and increase European Union (EU) commitments to supporting the process of political and economic transition among its neighbors; coordinate approaches through joint or parallel actions to increase effectiveness.
	FY 2005	1. NATO expands headquarters training mission inside Iraq, establishes fully operational training center outside Baghdad for Iraqi officers. 2. NATO helps provide security for Afghan presidential and parliamentary elections, expands operation to western Afghanistan by establishing a Forward Support Base and four NATO-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams. 3. NATO increases engagement with broader Middle East and the Caucasus and Central Asia; NATO launches new, fully operational security cooperation program for the Middle East, which four Gulf States join; NATO enhances Partnership for Peace program in Central Asia and Caucasus, which leads three states to conclude Individualized Partnership Action Plans. 4. NATO concludes its nine-year stability operation in Bosnia and supports transition to an EU-led stability force, while continuing NATO counterterrorism, war criminal and defense reform missions inside Bosnia. 5. NATO expands relationship with Ukraine, concludes Status of Forces agreement with Russia. 6. NATO Response Force reaches initial operating capability, deployed for first time to Afghanistan.

RESULTS	2004	1. NATO launched headquarters training mission in Iraq. 2. NATO expanded operations inside Afghanistan to include nine northern provinces and Kabul. 3. NATO and EU planned transition for a NATO-led to EU-led stability force in Bosnia, the most ambitious NATO-EU cooperation effort to date. 4. Seven former Communist nations joined NATO as full Allies. 5. Thirty-five European and Eurasian countries have troops deployed in Iraq, 24 in Afghanistan, and 32 in NATO operations in the Balkans. 6. NATO expanded relations with post-Rose Revolution Georgia by concluding Individualized Partnership Action Plan.
	2003	1. Agreement reached with Allies to reform NATO's command structure. European partners committed themselves to boosting European capabilities. NRF in process of development. 2. Ratifications by Allies on track to welcome new members by May 2004. 3. Progress made on NATO-Russia projects, including military-to-military cooperation. Retooling PfP to better meet the needs of the Central Asia/Caucasus partners. NATO-Ukraine Action Plan launched in which Ukraine, with NATO's assistance, agreed to undertake necessary reforms.
	2002	1. Europeans made pledges at Prague to improve their capabilities. Seven new members invited at Prague. Berlin Plus would have allowed the EU to borrow NATO assets and capabilities for European-led operations, but was not agreed upon. 2. Allied Heads of State and Government committed at Prague to enhance military capabilities by filling key shortfalls through the New Capabilities Initiative. The initiative will encourage pooling and specialization, introduce the NRF and reform NATO's Command Structure. U.S. export controls with key European allies streamlined to promote transatlantic defense industrial integration. 3. NATO-Russia Council and 2002 work plan established in May.
	2001	1. Minimal progress on the Defense Capabilities Initiative, protracted discussion on NATO-EU arrangements. 2. Redefined ESDP goals. 3. Expansion of NATO tied to Partner States. Significant progress made on MAP.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	NATO is the United States' foremost security relationship. Strong and effective ties with our European allies within NATO are essential to promote stability and protect U.S. interests in Europe and the world.
	Data Source	2004 PfP Report to Congress, Report to Congress on NATO enlargement, GAO reports on NATO Enlargement.

I/P #2: International Military Education and Training (IMET)

Strengthen the military capabilities of allies, friends, partners, and international organizations, which in turn serve U.S. national interests in many ways.

Output Indicator

Indicator #2: Number of Individuals Receiving Training Under IMET

TARGETS		
	FY 2006	12,800 individuals.
	FY 2005	11,484 individuals.

RESULTS		
	2004	11,689 individuals.
	2003	10,736 individuals.
	2002	10,417 individuals.
	2001	8,386 individuals.

DATA QUALITY		
	Indicator Validation	The number of foreign military personnel participating in IMET programs is an indication of increased foreign receptivity to the U.S. strategic approach and likely success in gaining foreign support on specific policy issues. The greater the number of IMET students, the greater the likelihood that future leaders will be drawn from these students and will therefore possess an appreciation for the interests of the U.S.
	Data Source	Data is based on Political-Military Affairs bureau and regional bureau assessments of participation by foreign countries.

I/P #3: Military Assistance for New NATO and NATO Aspirant Nations (PART Program)

U.S. military equipment, services, and training for the governments of the ten new NATO countries recently offered NATO membership - Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

Outcome Indicator

Indicator #3: Aspirants Making Progress Achieving NATO-Defined and Measured, Country-Specific Membership Action Plans

TARGETS		
	FY 2006	1. New members fully integrated into revised command structure and making measurable progress toward meeting force goals. 2. Remaining aspirants (Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia) accelerate military reform and increase number of deployment-ready niche units through Adriatic Charter.
	FY 2005	1. All new allies contribute to each aspect of alliance activities, including mentoring of aspirants, and are integrated into revised command arrangements. 2. Aspirant nations accelerate their reform efforts through Member Action Plans (MAP); intensify Adriatic Charter cooperation.

RESULTS		
	2004	1. One hundred percent of NATO aspirants made progress toward NATO-defined and measured, country-specific MAP. 2. Formal entry of New Allies, who complete full integration into NATO, and assist mentoring of Aspirants. 3. MAP cycle continued for aspirants; Adriatic Charter cooperation took shape.
	2003	1. Accession Protocols signed by 19 Allies in March 2003; U.S. Senate ratification in May 2003. Invitees' reforms took place, in line with NATO requirements for membership. 2. Aspirants continue MAP process and, with the U.S., signed the Adriatic Charter, where all parties pledge to work together to move reform efforts towards NATO and EU membership.
	2002	1. Sixty percent of NATO aspirants made progress toward achieving NATO-defined and measured, country-specific MAP. Prague Summit issued membership invitations to seven countries: Estonia, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 2. Three continuing NATO Aspirants (Croatia, Albania and Macedonia) continued to participate in NATO's MAP.
	2001	Numerous countries' participation in military operations (OEF, ISAF, SFOR, and KFOR); in Afghanistan and in the Arabian Gulf. Among others, the Baltic countries, Bulgaria, and Romania contributed forces to the Balkans and/or Central Asia/Caucasus; Czech medical unit in OEF.

DATA QUALITY		
	Indicator Validation	Indicates political will to integrate defense with NATO's as a whole.
	Data Source	NATO International Staff Consolidated & Individual MAP Progress Reports, Annual ANP Submissions.

Efficiency Indicator

Indicator #4: Number of Countries Reaching Sustainable State of Niche Capabilities

TARGETS		
	FY 2006	3/13; meaning there are 13 countries that should eventually establish niche capabilities.
	FY 2005	2/13; Poland recognized as developed niche command capability.

RESULTS		
	2004	1/13; Czech-led NATO CBRN unit deployed to Athens for Olympics. Poland built niche command expertise.
	2003	1/13; Poland took command of a multinational division in Iraq. Czech Republic commands NATO CBRN unit.
	2002	<u>Baseline</u>: 1/13; The Czech Republic's Chemical Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) company recognized as a promising specialty asset within NATO.
	2001	N/A

DATA QUALITY		
	Indicator Validation	Indicates know-how to develop a niche specialty and the political will to sustain it. By providing resources to assist new Allies and NATO aspirants to develop specialized capabilities, the USG is addressing needs identified and prioritized by NATO and EUCOM while promoting the transformation of NATO to meet emerging threats. Fostering the development of niche capabilities helps launch new Allies as vital elements of the common defense.
	Data Source	NATO planning documents. NATO-led and U.S.-led deployments.

I/P #4: Regional Stability in East Asia and the Pacific

Use diplomacy to foster stability in the EAP region.

Outcome Indicator

Indicator #5: Status of U.S.-South Korean Relations

TARGETS		
	FY 2006	Complete specified mission transfers to Republic of Korea (ROK) military. Complete comprehensive security assessment.
	FY 2005	Continue U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK) relocations from Yongsan and other facilities as jointly agreed with the ROK Government on a timeline to complete moves as new ROK-funded acquisition and construction projects are completed.

RESULTS		
	2004	Started USFK relocation.
	2003	Talks between the U.S. and ROK on the "Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative" produced a timetable and division of costs for the reconfiguration of USFK during 2004 – 2008.
	2002	Began Phase II of Joint Study on Future of U.S.-South Korean Alliance.
	2001	Began interagency discussion of the Future of U.S.-South Korean Alliance.

DATA QUALITY		
	Indicator Validation	Implementation of the measures approved for the Future of the U.S.-ROK Alliance will strengthen the alliance for the long-term.
	Data Source	Once completed, the Future of the U.S.-ROK Alliance will be available as a document.

Annual Performance Goal #2
EXISTING AND EMERGENT REGIONAL CONFLICTS ARE CONTAINED OR RESOLVED

I/P #5: Prevent/Resolve Regional and Local Conflicts

Improve our capacity to maintain stability, defuse tensions, and resolve conflicts.

Outcome Indicator

Indicator #1: Status of Chinese Cooperation on Regional Stability

TARGETS	**FY 2006**	1. China continues to host and participates in Six-Party settlement of North Korea (NK) nuclear issue. 2. Cross-Strait dialogue produces confidence-building agreements. 3. Senior China and Taiwan representatives exchange visits and discuss possibility of direct links. 4. Actual reduction in military buildup opposite Taiwan Strait.
	FY 2005	China's active diplomacy continues to result in forward progress in Six-Party talks. China-ASEAN enhance confidence-building measures (CBMs) on trade and maritime ties; China, ASEAN and UN to promote Burma political opening.
RESULTS	2004	China facilitated two working group and two working party meetings on NK; China-India Vice Ministerial Talks reduce tensions in South Asia; China provides economic and technical assistance for Iraq and Afghanistan reconstruction and assists Middle East peace process in the UN.
	2003	1. China discussed its bilateral border disputes with Indian officials. 2. China played a crucial role in facilitating multilateral talks with NK on maintaining a nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula.
	2002	China encouraged NK openness and multilateral dialogue to end its nuclear weapons program. China's public statements at Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) ministerial were helpful in maintaining a nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula.
	2001	1. Limited Chinese tension-reducing diplomatic efforts toward NK and South Asia. 2. China cooperated in encouraging NK openness and dialogue.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	China is capable of playing a significant role in reducing tension in the region.
	Data Source	Cable reports and memoranda of communication from U.S. overseas posts, intelligence reporting, regional allies, and NGOs will confirm China's actions with regard to reducing regional tensions.

I/P #6: Conflict Management and Mitigation

Use a variety of diplomatic and foreign assistance tools to turn despair into hope.

Output Indicator

Indicator #2: Progress Made in Advancement of a Peace Process (Worldwide)

TARGETS		
	FY 2006	1. 5% increase over FY 2005 in number and types of events in support of peace processes (i.e., peace conferences, dialogues, training course, workshops, and seminars). 2. 5% increase over FY 2005 in number of officials and key decision-makers trained in peacebuilding/conflict resolution/mitigation skills. 3. 5% increase over FY 2005 number of people trained in conflict mitigation/resolution. 4. 5% increase over FY 2005 in number of USAID-sponsored justice centers. 5. 5% increase in number of people reached by conflict prevention/mitigation media campaigns (disaggregated by country).
	FY 2005	1. 5% increase over FY 2004 in number and types of events in support of peace processes (i.e., peace conferences, dialogues, training course, workshops, and seminars). 2. 5% increase over FY 2004 in number of officials and key decision-makers trained in peacebuilding/conflict resolution/mitigation skills. 3. 5% increase over FY 2004 in number of people trained in conflict mitigation/resolution (disaggregated by country). 4. 4% increase over FY 2004 in number of USAID-sponsored justice centers. 5. 4% increase in number of people reached by conflict prevention/mitigation media campaigns (disaggregated by country).

RESULTS		
	2004	Baselines: Number and types of events in support of peace processes: 1,126 (peace conferences, dialogues, training course, workshops, seminars). Number of officials and key decision-makers trained in peacebuilding/conflict resolution/mitigation skills: 3,301 Number of people trained in conflict mitigation/resolution (disaggregated by country): 17,581 Number of USAID-sponsored justice centers (data forthcoming): 33 Number of people reached by conflict prevention/mitigation media campaigns: 7,295,860
	2003-2001	N/A

DATA QUALITY		
	Indicator Validation	Peace cannot be achieved without extensive effort to reach all parties through the broadest means possible.
	Data Source	Aggregation of USAID mission responses worldwide.

Outcome Indicator		
Indicator #3: Number of African Armed Conflicts Resolved and Peace Support Missions Concluded		
TARGETS	**FY 2006**	1. Peacekeeping operations closed in Sierra Leone. 2. Peacekeeping downsizing in Ethiopia-Eritrea. Downsizing plans developed for Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 3. Peacekeeping operations continue in Burundi and Sudan.
	FY 2005	One conflict ends and peacekeeping mission deploys (Sudan). Peacekeeping operations continue in Liberia, DRC, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, and Ethiopia-Eritrea.
RESULTS	2004	Peacekeeping operations continued in DRC, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Cote d'Ivoire and Burundi.
	2003	Three conflicts resolved (Liberia, DRC, and Burundi). Peacekeeping forces deploy in Liberia and Burundi.
	2002	No conflicts resolved, no peacekeeping missions withdrawn. Special protection mission deploys to Burundi.
	2001	One conflict resolved (Ethiopia-Eritrea) and peacekeeping mission deploys.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Regional stability in Africa is greatly enhanced when conflicts end and parties to the conflict embark on a post-conflict process of reconciliation and reconstruction. Two clear indicators that parties engaged in armed conflict are on the path of peace are when peace agreements are signed and peacekeeping forces deploy to monitor the post-peace process. One clear indicator that they have completed the post conflict process and are on the path to longer-term stability is when peacekeeping forces leave the country/region.
	Data Source	Embassy, UN, NGO and press reporting.

		Outcome Indicator
		Indicator #4: Progress of Implementation of Sudan Peace Process
TARGETS	**FY 2006**	1. Regional democratic elections are planned; non-violent transitions to appropriate new government in Sudan or at a minimum, preparation activities toward a program of democratic elections are put in place. 2. Military reform continues with additional assistance provided to southern Army. 3. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) on both sides results in force reduction of forty percent globally. 4. Forty percent of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) return home. Darfur IDPs and refugees return home.
	FY 2005	1. The interim period begins. There is a smooth transition as all elements of the peace agreement are implemented. 2. A sustained international aid and development program begins to support the implementation of the peace agreement leading up to elections. 3. Refugees and IDPs returning home. 4. UN monitoring mission deploys. 5. Active combat in Darfur ends and relief organizations meet needs of vulnerable persons. 6. Political solution to Darfur achieved within framework of the North-South agreement.
RESULTS	2004	1. Power and wealth sharing agreements signed. 2. Comprehensive agreement being negotiated. 3. Crisis in Darfur eclipses Government of Sudan (GOS) - Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) peacemaking efforts. 4. GOS not yet able to rein in Jingaweit militia as humanitarian crisis worsens. 5. African Union deployed ceasefire monitors with U.S. assistance.
	2003	1. U.S. Government (USG) continued playing a strong role in the Inter-governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) peace process. Talks continued moving toward conclusion. 2. Wide-ranging USG planning in the event of peace undertaken; most planning targets were identified. 3. Ceasefire monitoring continued; DDR planning underway.
	2002	1. Both the GOS and the SPLM/Army began a peace process, resolving two of the most contentious issues: the role of religion and the right of self-determination. 2. Nuba Mountains ceasefire agreement concluded, international monitoring operations begun and humanitarian support provided. 3. Civilian Protection Monitoring Team prepared to stand up. 4. Zones of Tranquility and Slavery Commission work conducted.
	2001	1. Sudan at war, including gross underdevelopment and humanitarian deprivations in the Nuba Mountains region and the south of the country. 2. Violations of human rights throughout Sudan, especially in the Nuba Mountains and the south.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	A peaceful Sudan with an inclusive government based on the rule of law could be a hedge against regional instability and an important partner in the global war on terrorism. Ending conflict will also alleviate one of the world's worst humanitarian situations and propel regional economic prospects.
	Data Source	Embassy, USAID, UN, and NGO reporting.

		Outcome Indicator
		Indicator #5: Status of Regional Security in the Mano River Countries of Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone

TARGETS	**FY 2006**	1. Liberia holds acceptable elections with nonviolent aftermath. 2. Security sector reform continues in Liberia with newly trained police and military units deployed. 3. The countries remain at peace, posting Gross Domestic Product growth twice that of population growth and boosting their rankings in Freedom House's index of "free" nations by at least ten percentage points. 4. Seventy-five percent or more of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees return home. 5. All international/regional forces withdraw.
	FY 2005	1. With international funding, Liberians disarm and demobilize. Liberia begins reform of its security forces, submits transparent budgets, and resumes debt payments. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank resume programs. UN Mission in Liberia forces continue to monitor Liberian peace process. 2. The UN and NGOs develop Liberian National Elections Commission competency in preparing a census, redistricting, voter registration and education programs, and ballots. NGOs support Liberian political party training and media center. Liberia becomes eligible for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries and Paris Club programs. 3. Sierra Leone and Guinea remain stable and free of significant conflict. Number of refugees and IDPs in the region drops by 50%. UNAMSIL withdraws by December 31, 2005.
RESULTS	2004	1. The Liberian peace agreement was holding. 2. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) was proceeding smoothly. 3. UN forces were deployed throughout most of the country. 4. IDPs and refugees were returning home. 5. Sierra Leone remained calm as UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) continued its phased withdrawal.
	2003	1. The Liberian civil war deteriorated starting in May 2003. Peace talks began in Ghana in June 2003 and a comprehensive peace agreement was signed on August 18, 2003. 2. The U.S. provided nearly $26 million in logistics support to enable the deployment of Economic Community Of West African States peacekeeping forces. 3. The peace in Sierra Leone was still somewhat fragile, and Guinea's stability was questionable. 4. 259,000 refugees and 425,000 IDPs in the region. 5. UNAMSIL began phased withdrawal and UNMIL was fully deployed and the DDR process began, along with planning for security sector reform.
	2002	1. UNAMSIL planned withdrawal of forces as training of Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces continued. 2. 259,000 refugees and 425,000 IDPs in the region.
	2001	1. Liberia and Guinea promoting instability in neighbors. 2. 463,000 refugees and 570,000 IDPs in the region. 3. Sierra Leone stabilizing with deployment of 17,500 peacekeepers of UNAMSIL.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone have been the site of war and other instability for at least the past 15 years, at untold humanitarian and economic cost to the countries and the region. Realizing a just peace will ensure that human resources and markets can better prosper and thereby decrease the region's potential as the site for potential terrorist or other illicit activities (including environmental degradation).
	Data Source	Embassy, UN, NGO and press reporting.

I/P #7: Regional Security Cooperation and Arms Control

Promote stability, security, democracy, and prosperity within the region and build support for U.S. strategic goals beyond Europe.

Output Indicator

Indicator #6: Progress of Implementation of the Adapted CFE Treaty

TARGETS		
	FY 2006	Entry into force of the Adapted CFE Treaty and accession discussions with additional Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) states that wish to join.
	FY 2005	Russia acts to fulfill remaining Istanbul commitments on Georgia and Moldova. The U.S. and NATO Allies agree that Russian Istanbul commitments have been completed and begin procedures for ratifying the Adapted CFE Treaty.

RESULTS		
	2004	Russia has not fulfilled all Istanbul Commitments. Russia still needs to reach agreement with Georgia on remaining issues regarding the status of the Russian presence at the Gudauta base and its future use, and the duration of Russian presence in Batumi and Alkhalkalai. Russia also needs to complete the withdrawal of its forces from Moldova, which virtually stalled in 2004. The U.S. and NATO continued to press Russia to fulfill these commitments, but there has been no progress on key issues to report in FY 2004. Russia and the new Georgian government have been meeting, but progress on a Russian withdrawal from remaining bases has fallen victim to broader Russian-Georgian problems.
	2003	1. Major progress was made in calendar year 2003 on withdrawal of Russian forces from Moldova; some 20,000 tons of Russian munitions stored in depots in the Trannistrian region had been withdrawn by the end of the year. 2. Russia did not meet the OSCE's extended December 31, 2003 deadline to withdraw forces from Moldova. 3. Progress on withdrawal of Russian bases from Georgia stalled for most of 2003, despite limited progress on technical issues. 4. Russian equipment levels in the CFE Flank region remain below Adapted CFE Treaty Flank Limits.
	2002	1. Russia fulfilled its Istanbul commitment on the flank by reducing its flank equipment to Adapted Treaty levels. 2. Russia needs to reach agreement with Georgia on remaining issues re: Gudauta base and its future use, and the duration of Russian presence in Batumi and Alkhalkalai. Russia also needs to complete the removal and destruction of munitions and small arms in Moldova and withdraw its military forces. 3. Conditions for U.S. ratification of Adapted CFE Treaty were not met.
	2001	1. Second Review Conference of CFE Treaty successfully concluded and advanced U.S. and NATO interests. 2. NATO remained firm in demanding Russian compliance with Istanbul commitments. 3. Russia completed withdrawal of declared CFE Treaty-limited equipment (TLE) from Moldova; initial withdrawal of excess TLE from Georgia was completed in 2000; Russia closed the Vaziani base before July 1, 2001, but forces remained at the Gudauta base.

DATA QUALITY		
	Indicator Validation	The 1990 CFE Treaty has long been considered one of the cornerstones of European security. The 1999 Adapted CFE Treaty revised the CFE Treaty to meet the new security environment in post-Cold War Europe, while retaining the benefits of transparency, predictability, and U.S. force deployment flexibility. Entry into force of the Adapted CFE Treaty and its smooth implementation will contribute to a stable and secure Europe. The U.S. works closely with its NATO Allies in coordinating positions regarding CFE issues, reinforcing the U.S. role in European security.
	Data Source	U.S. representatives' and Embassies' reporting; reports of meetings; information released by states involved.

I/P #8: Peace Support Operations

Build international capacity to conduct Peace Support Operations (PSO) in order to improve international crisis response, enhance regional stability, and reduce the demand on the armed forces of the U.S. and key allies.

Output Indicator

Indicator #7: Percentage of EIPC-funded, PSO-Trained Countries That Pledge Military Units or Participate in the UN Peacekeeping Standby Arrangement System or Multinational Military Operations of High U.S. Foreign Policy Interest

TARGETS	**FY 2006**	90%
	FY 2005	90%
RESULTS	2004	88%
	2003	85.1%
	2002	85%
	2001	Baseline: 85%
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	An expanding pool of qualified international peacekeepers and improvements in effectiveness of foreign militaries in PSO.
	Data Source	Comparison of UN Standby list with list of EIPC recipients.

I/P #9: Implementation of the Road Map

Implement the President's vision for a permanent, peaceful, two-state solution of the Israeli-Palestinian problem, leading to a comprehensive peace on all tracks, including Israel and its neighbors.

Outcome Indicator

Indicator #8: Progress of Implementation of the Road Map Leading to an Independent, Democratic Palestinian State Existing Side-by-Side with Israel in Peace and Security

TARGETS	**FY 2006**	1. Permanent Status Agreement and end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and progress on the Syrian-Israeli and Israeli-Lebanese tracks. 2. Establishment of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders. 3. Arab states accept full and normal relations with Israel. 4. Continued implementation of prior agreements. 5. Enhanced international monitoring of roadmap implementation. 6. Second international conference convened by Quartet. 7. Private Israelis and Palestinians participate freely with full official support in joint meetings, exchange projects, and people-to-people activities and receive coverage in the Israeli and Palestinian media.
	FY 2005	1. Cessation of violence. 2. Increased Palestinian territorial contiguity. With the emergence of a Palestinian leadership not corrupted by terror, an announcement of Palestinian state with provisional borders. 3. Arab-Israeli multilateral talks resume. Renewed trust between the sides permits end to Jericho prison monitoring program. Permanent status talks begin. Israeli, Palestinian, and regional Arab nonofficial experts resume dialogue on political, security, arms control, and other regional issues. 4. In Gaza, active public diplomacy and public affairs programming resumes with NGOs, professional associations, and academic institutions. 5. Implementation of prior agreements. Enhanced international monitoring of road map implementation. First international conference convened by Quartet. 6. Private Israelis and Palestinians participate freely with full official support in joint meetings, exchange projects, and people-to-people activities and receive coverage in the Israeli and Palestinian media.
RESULTS	2004	1. Worked with the Quartet (U.S., UN, EU, Russia) and other regional and international partners to lay the foundation for success of Israel's Gaza Disengagement initiative and return to roadmap implementation. 2. Supported the Palestinian Authority in preparing for successful local and presidential elections during a period of unprecedented leadership transition. 3. Supported the Palestinian Authority in pursuing its institutional and economic reform agenda. 4. Through targeted financial, humanitarian, and technical assistance, reduced Palestinian poverty and malnutrition.
	2003	Roadmap to peace introduced. Intermittent cessation of violence. Dialogue between the President and Palestinian and Israeli Prime Ministers. Deployment of a full-time senior representative to the region who has coordinated efforts to implement the roadmap.
	2002	Periodic, often large-scale, Palestinian terrorist attacks targeted at Israel, often followed by harsh preventive, retaliatory, or deterrent Israeli military actions. Significant civilian casualties on both sides.
	2001	U.S. encouraged both sides to reach a ceasefire and resume dialogue.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	The indicator corresponds to the vision articulated by the President in his June 24 speech of two states, Israel and Palestine, existing side by side in peace and security, with goals geared to roadmap obligations.
	Data Source	Post reporting, cite visits, other governments and institutions (World Bank, IMF, NGOs), media reports, intelligence reports.

I/P #10: Iraq and Gulf Security

Work with our allies in the Gulf to confront any threats to the region, including weapons of mass destruction and terrorism from al-Qaeda or others.

Outcome Indicator

Indicator #9: Free, Democratic, and Whole Iraq at Peace with Itself and its Neighbors

TARGETS		
	FY 2006	1. Permanent constitution stands for ratification; elections held for government per the provisions permanent constitution, and government takes office. 2. Iraqi democratic and civil society institutions develop further. Governance capacity at all levels increases. 3. Iraq assumes primary responsibility for own security, able to defend itself without being a threat to neighbors. 4. Iraqi security services continue to grow and develop professional skills and organization to effectively provide for Iraq's internal and external security.
	FY 2005	1. Elections for the Transitional National Assembly, which will produce the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) held and ITG takes office. 2. Permanent constitution drafted. 3. Rule of law and civil society take root. 4. Free media serves as responsible watchdog on governmental power. 5. Iraq assumes primary responsibility for own security, able to defend itself without being a threat to neighbors.

RESULTS		
	2004	1. Iraqi GC assumes additional responsibilities. 2. Transitional Administrative Law drafted and approved. 3. Iraqi Interim government assumes full sovereignty; continued political, legal and economic reform. National Conference held. 4. Iraqi Interim National Council selected and begins operating. 5. Democratic institutions, rule of law, civil society, free media started. 6. Accountability and anti-corruption efforts began to take hold. 7. UNSCR 1546 recognized the IIG and spelled out the UN's role in the transition to democratic rule. 8. Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq established and begins preparations for January 2005 elections, assisted by the UN.
	2003	1. Saddam Hussein's regime overthrown. The Department worked closely with DoD and CPA to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. The Department continues to support the development of strategies to move Iraq towards democracy, rule of law, build free market economy, including non-oil sector; build Iraqi security forces, subordinate to constitutional authority, capable of relieving U.S. and Coalition forces. 2. The Department's engagement at the UN is consistent with the responsibilities outlined in UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1483. UNSCR 1500 reaffirms the UN's support for the Governing Council and fortifies the important role for the UN in Iraq by establishing a UN Assistance Mission to support the work of the UN Special Representative in Iraq. UN agencies have been making critical contributions in humanitarian assistance and economic reform in Iraq.
	2002	Saddam Hussein still in power; UN sanctions remain in effect.
	2001	Saddam Hussein's regime entrenched in Iraq; UN sanctions remain in effect.

DATA QUALITY		
	Indicator Validation	Free and democratic Iraq would contribute to economic and political stability in the region.
	Data Source	U.S. Mission post reports.

I/P #11: Iraq Reconstruction and Economic Development

Work with our allies in the Gulf to confront any threats to the region, including weapons of mass destruction and terrorism from al-Qaeda or others.

Outcome Indicator

Indicator #10: Per Capita Growth Domestic Product (GDP)

TARGETS	FY 2006	Per capita GDP increases by 4.5%.
	FY 2005	1. Per capita GDP increases by 10%. 2. Infant mortality rate declines to 35 per 1000.
RESULTS	2004	1. Per capita GDP increased by 10%. 2. Infant mortality rate declined to 45 per 1000.
	2003	No significant results due to recent end of conflict.
	2002	Data not available.
	2001	1. Purchasing power parity per capita GDP was $2500; GDP growth rate is 5.7%. 2. Estimated infant mortality rate was 57.61 per 1000 (CIA Fact Book).
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	GDP is widely recognized as an indicium that accurately portrays economic growth and development in a country.
	Data Source	International Monetary Fund: Iraq Debt Sustainability Analysis (2004).

I/P #12: Security Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa
(PART Program)

Enhance ability of Africans to reduce conflict on the continent.

Output Indicator

Indicator #11: Percentage of U.S.-Trained African Units Deployed to Peace Support/Humanitarian Response Operations

TARGETS	**FY 2006**	Of all African battalions (or their equivalent) deployed in Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) globally, approximately 75% will have significant staff and unit training experience under U.S. or U.S.-trained trainers.
	FY 2005	Of all African battalions (or their equivalent) deployed in PKO globally, approximately 70% will have significant staff and unit training experience under U.S. or U.S.-trained trainers.
RESULTS	2004	Of all African battalions (or their equivalent) deployed in PKO globally, approximately 65% will have significant staff and unit training experience under U.S. or U.S.-trained trainers.
	2003	Seven (7) African contingents trained by the U.S. or U.S.-trained trainers engaged in peace support missions. An additional five contingents planned for Peace Support Operations (PSO) participation in Liberia and Burundi. ECOWAS forces, with significant U.S. support and training, deployed to Liberia and decreased the need to deploy a large U.S. force to mitigate the conflict.
	2002	Five (5) U.S.-trained battalion-sized units successfully participating in peacekeeping or contingency operations.
	2001	Five (5) U.S.-trained battalion-sized units successfully participating in peacekeeping or contingency operations.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	A U.S.-trained African unit or one trained by U.S.-trained trainers will perform better than one not provided such training or its equivalent. Also, African PKO requirements are expected to remain high and therefore improved African capability will lessen calls for the use of U.S. forces.
	Data Source	UN DPKO, Embassy and NGO reporting.

Efficiency Indicator

Indicator #12: Rate of Program Country Sustainment – Cost to Train and Equip One Battalion of U.S.-trained or U.S. Trainer-trained African Peacekeeping Troops

TARGETS	**FY 2006**	$1M to produce 1 battalion.
	FY 2005	$1M to produce 1 battalion.
RESULTS	2004	$15M to produce 14 battalions.
	2003	$8M to produce 6 battalions.
	2002	$15M to produce 4 battalions.
	2001	Baseline: $75M to produce 8 battalions.
DATA QUALITY	Indicator Validation	Ensuring that African militaries begin to train their own peacekeeping troops is vital if the Department is to break the cycle of one time training events. Such a cycle is more expensive and fails to transmit long-term capacity. Measuring the decrease in costs to train one unit for peacekeeping over time is the best methodology.
	Data Source	The data for these figures are produced by our Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA).

I/P #13: Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities
(PART Program)

Maintain international peace and security by taking effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace.

Efficiency Indicator

Indicator #13: Total Assessed UN Peacekeeping Mission Expenditures Divided by the Total UN Peacekeeping Mission Staff

TARGETS		
	FY 2006	$40,400
	FY 2005	$41,400

RESULTS		
	2004	$42,400
	2003	$43,400
	2002-2001	N/A

DATA QUALITY		
	Indicator Validation	Once the United States pays its assessed contributions, it no longer has direct control of the use of those funds. The only efficiency that can be measured is thus that of the United Nations itself in its peacekeeping activities. Because of the great variance among the 17 active peacekeeping missions, an aggregate measure, the "Total Assessed UN Peacekeeping Mission Expenditures Divided by the Total UN Peacekeeping Mission Staff" has been chosen. The measure may be skewed at times by the inherent inefficiencies of starting up new missions, and will also be subject to dollar inflation and exchange rate variations.
	Data Source	The two figures chosen as factors for this calculation are available from statistics produced by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the Fifth Committee of the UN General Assembly.

Efficiency Indicator

Indicator #14: Per Unit Cost of USG-Funded OSCE Election Observation

TARGETS		
	FY 2006	15% below baseline.
	FY 2005	15% below baseline.

RESULTS		
	2004	10% below baseline.
	2003	5% below baseline.
	2002	Baseline: $6,500 per long-term observer; $3,700 per short-term observer.
	2001	N/A

DATA QUALITY		
	Indicator Validation	Measuring the decrease in costs per unit of is the best methodology.
	Data Source	Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.

V. Illustrative Examples of FY 2004 Achievements

Regional Stability	
Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) Program	The mission of the ACOTA Program is to enhance the capacity of African partner militaries to participate in multinational peace support and humanitarian operations. To date, ACOTA, and its predecessor ACRI, have provided training and key non-lethal equipment to over 15,000 peacekeepers from ten African nations. ACOTA-trained soldiers have served under the UN, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU), and are currently serving in Burundi, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia-Eritrea and Sierra Leone. U.S.-trained peacekeepers have received high marks and have enhanced the ability of Africans to better manage and resolve their own conflicts. For example, U.S. training and other assistance in 2004 played a direct role in ensuring a safe and expeditious deployment of African peacekeepers to Burundi and Liberia (ECOMIL). Besides ACOTA training of such troop contributing countries as Senegal, Ghana, Ethiopia and Kenya, FY 2004 PKO funding provided logistical assistance in transporting and sustaining deploying contingents. As a result of the U.S. assistance, the AU stabilized Burundi and ECOWAS was able to stabilize greater Monrovia and stave off any requirement to place large numbers of U.S. military personnel on the ground.
Burundi	USAID provided $1,000,000 in FY 2004 while leveraging $500,000 from AFR to program activities to mitigate land-related conflict. These activities seek to address both transitional issues, particularly those related to the most immediate threats and development objectives once the transitional period ends. The land issue is addressed in two ways: first by creating "breathing room" within which a participatory dialogue on land and resettlement can take place as developing policies related to land is a longer term process and secondly, to create livelihood and food security opportunities to stimulate economic development. In addition, since over two-thirds of Burundians are practicing Catholics, the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) is working on a unique three-year project to promote a culture of peace and reconciliation through the Catholic Church in Burundi. This project will be managed by the Catholic Relief Service (CRS) and will have strong secular dimensions. The project will focus on education programs for peace and reconciliation and trauma healing provided by Catholic institutions for the general Burundian population.

Regional Stability *(Cont'd)*

Sudan	The road to peace in Sudan has been a long one, beginning in 2002 with efforts to implement Special Envoy Danforth's four humanitarian proposals to test the will of the Sudanese parties in support of peace. Two of the four initiatives involved facilitating a humanitarian cease-fire in the Nuba Mountains region and halting attacks against civilians. These two proposals were supported with PKO and ESF funding in FY 2002, 2003, and 2004. Of note, the U.S. worked with Norway and others to support the Joint Military Commission (JMC) in the Nuba Mountains, which has permitted a dramatic improvement in the humanitarian situation in the Nubas and provided a venue to establish better relations between very distrustful parties and to build confidence in the overall process. Because of the monitored ceasefire, humanitarian and development assistance has flowed into the region and tens of thousands of Nuba Mountains citizens have returned. The Nubas ceasefire effort is seen by the parties as an area of sustained conflict resolution and cooperation and has been an important confidence builder in the run-up to final negotiations on a comprehensive agreement. As the humanitarian situation deteriorated in Darfur, the Department also supported the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) with logistics and equipment thus enabling African monitors to help pressure the Sudanese government and rebels to comply with signed agreements and to enable humanitarian assistance. During the war, many southern Sudanese intellectuals joined the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in the early 1980s and lived as guerillas. Now that the South is on the verge of peace, many SPLM officials need to be retrained. In January-March 2004, 12 SPLM officials were brought to Iowa State University for a semester under the guidance of USAID. In June 2004, an Iowa State professor taught 25 SPLM officials in the Sudan.
Peacekeeping Participation	Many peace support operation (PSO) recipient countries have supported coalition operations led by the U.S., such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq. For example, Mongolia received peace support assistance in FY 2000, 2001, and 2003. Prior to 2000, Mongolia had not had a national policy of deploying forces beyond its borders, yet it became the first coalition country to contribute an infantry battalion in Iraq.

VI. Resource Detail

Table 1: State Appropriations by Bureau ($ Thousands)

Bureau	FY 2004 Actual	FY 2005 Estimate	FY 2006 Request
International Organization Affairs	$1,050,381	$970,056	$1,622,476
East Asian and Pacific Affairs	50,095	51,499	52,818
European and Eurasian Affairs	47,182	47,441	47,410
Near Eastern Affairs	28,223	28,700	40,485
Other Bureaus	174,127	109,270	116,413
Total State Appropriations	**$1,350,008**	**$1,206,966**	**$1,879,602**

Table 2: Foreign Operations by Account ($ Thousands**)**

Title/Accounts	FY 2004 Actual		FY 2006 Request
Export-Import Bank			
Overseas Private Investment Corporation			
Trade and Development Agency			
USAID	120,876	73,481	88,506
Global HIV/AIDS Initiative			
Other Bilateral Economic Assistance	807,209	649,757	355,871
Independent Agencies			
Department of State	7,487	8,776	38,403
Department of Treasury			
Conflict Response Fund	0	0	100,000
Millennium Challenge Account			
International Military Education and Training	75,974	67,548	66,474
Foreign Military Financing	3,943,473	3,736,048	3,475,500
Peacekeeping Operations	62,239	88,784	97,900
International Development Association			
International Financial Institutions			
International Organizations and Programs	0	595	0
Total Foreign Operations	**$5,017,258**	**$4,624,989**	**$4,222,654**

Grand Total	**$6,367,266**	**$5,831,955**	**$6,102,256**